MingCampbell.org.uk

The British Syrian Society - The Sir Dave Gore-Booth Annual Lecture
Wednesday 22nd October, Dartmouth House, London

I must begin with a confession. You have come to a lecture entitled “A Liberal Foreign Policy” albeit with a capital “L” and a question mark.

This title was chosen some time ago.

But current events compel me to take a rather liberal approach to my subject because it does seem to me that the outcome of the Presidential election is bound to have an impact on foreign policy for all of us liberal or otherwise.

I hope, therefore, you will allow me to view my subject through a transatlantic prism.

But I cannot begin with out paying tribute to David Gore-Booth, whose contribution to foreign policy thinking particularly on the Middle East was immense, and whose reputation was truly international, and whose independence of mind was well documented.

With that caveat and tribute let me begin.

Consider if you will -

If the President of the United States had addressed the world after the horrifying events of 9/11 and had depicted them as a ‘crime against humanity’ rather than embarking on a so called “War against Terror” and thereafter proceeded to use every tool within international law, including military force if necessary, to bring the perpetrators to justice.

Would the world be a different place now?

Consider –

If the British Prime Minister when he visited the American President for a summit in April 2002 had told the President that there was no evidence that Iraq had anything to do with 9/11, rather than telling him that the British Government would support a policy of regime in Iraq.

Consider too if the British Prime Minister had told the President at that time that the legal advice he had received did not support regime change, and that the U.K. would not take part in any military action against Iraq without explicit authority from the UN Security Council.

Would the world be a different place now?

Consider – If Al Gore had been declared President in 2000 – would the United States approach to the issue of climate change have been otherwise?

Would the world be a different place now?

My purpose in asking these questions is not to re-write history but to demonstrate that personality matters in politics.

In a crisis, the quality of judgement of individuals and the core beliefs they hold will dramatically effect the decisions they take.

But some personalities have greater influence than others.

The occupant of the White House is one such personality.

Whoever is chosen by the American people in a few weeks time could radically alter the years ahead – not only for Americans, but for Europeans, for Africans, for Asians, for Iraqis, Afghanis, Iranians, Syrians, Israelis, Palestinians.

But the factors that limit a leader’s room for action are particularly significant in democratic societies.

National political and social culture, geography, technology, legal systems, military and diplomatic capacity, the free media, the views of allies and international organisations – all of these act strongly to limit room for manoeuvre.

Today I intend to look ahead - to look at some of the issues facing the international community – particularly in the Middle East - and to judge how far the American President – is free or restrained to act.

And to consider what the two contenders for the Presidency might do if elected.

The Issues

The in-box of the new American President is daunting.

As Richard Holbrooke has set out so convincingly in his article in the current edition of “Foreign Affairs” magazine.

If we set aside the economic crisis for the moment, every issue which will face the President will require focus, attention and the ability to lead in new direction if they are to be successfully tackled.

What are these issues?

A stable Iraq that can stand on its own two feet?

Defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan and building a working unified state?

Helping to improve stability in Pakistan.

Preventing Al Qaida and other terrorist networks from entrenching and extending their fanaticism and preventing further attacks.

Breaking the logjams in the Middle East peace process.

These are only some of the immediate challenges.

The long term strategic demands are just as pressing.

Countering the spread of nuclear weapons and materials – addressing the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea – formulating a meaningful approach to the 2010 non-proliferation conference.

How to approach remerging Russian nationalism.

Managing China peacefully into a constructive position in international affairs.

Poverty and conflict in Africa.

Development in Central and South America.

Remodelling international institutions for a globalised world.

And of course the most important of all, tackling climate change to ensure the survival of our citizens and their civilisations.

This is not new territory for an American President.

The United States as the most powerful nation in the world has been at the heart of the solutions to most major crises over the last century.

During the second half of 20th Century the unifying threats explicit in the Cold War and the policy of containment allowed coherent prioritisation to take place.

Strategic decisions could be taken and tactics employed within a structure that was generally understood no matter which side of the wall you stood on.

But the “War on Terror” - is not a strategy.

It is unfocused, ill-defined and counter productive.

It is ill suited to application to the long-term issues I have set out above.

And the tactics used to prosecute the “War on Terror” have undermined strategic objectives.

It has left the American government and its supporters and allies morally and legally exposed when tackling regional issues.

The invasion of Iraq in particular has allowed other nations to withstand legitimate US and European disapproval over their actions – Russia’s actions in Georgia for instance.

Similarly the suspension of legal and moral codes – as in detention at Guantanamo Bay, extraordinary rendition, torture – has been a grave strategic mistake.

Embroiled as they are in an election campaign it is perhaps not surprising that neither presidential contender has yet appeared to grasp the strategic implications of the near collapse of the banking structure and the chaos in global markets.

The security implications of the economic crisis are profound.

But economic strength, global influence and power go hand in hand, who believes that the distribution of that power will not be the same when stability is restored.

It too is a mark of the interconnected nature of the globalised financial system that contagion can spread so fast and have such far reaching consequences for the economies of all nations.

Russian stocks for example, have fallen 70% since May.

The ‘great capitalist peace’ that some have predicted since the end of the Cold War is unlikely to be so great, so capitalist or so peaceful.

And the America we can expect to emerge from this turmoil may be less confident, less self-assured, less outward looking.

Whether this will encourage sympathy for protectionism and isolationism in the U.S.A. is yet to be seen but it is clear that any comparative decline of American power as a result of the economic crisis will embolden its rivals.

In truth the American response to the economic crisis will define whether America can still lead in the way to which it has become accustomed.

The new President will require to put in place an over-arching strategic concept through which to approach the issues that face him.

There seems little sign of this so far in the current campaign.

Obama says he wishes to restore America’s reputation in the world while McCain seems to offer a modified version of the foreign policy of the current administration.

Senator Obama appears to offer a change of tone compared to Senator McCain, but on major policy issues such as Iran, the Middle East peace process, nuclear proliferation, the differences between the two men are discernible only to those who understand the nuances of the American political debate.

For example the future of the American commitment to Iraq has been a point of contention.

But as the election has progressed, and as Senator Obama has tacked back towards the centre after gaining the Democrat nomination, substantial differences are harder to find.

Senator Obama had initially spoken in strong terms about his willingness to speak directly to certain unpalatable regimes.

Recently, under fire from McCain, Obama has made it clear that face to face talks would only occur after significant ‘preparation’.

Is this a return to a policy of ‘pre-conditions’?

Even if not, it represents the minimisation of a substantial difference.

Obama has also felt it necessary to strengthen his pro-Israel rhetoric as the election has approached, leaving early hopes diminished of a fresh US approach to the Middle East under his leadership.

One significant point of difference would appear to be John McCain’s wish to move outside of the United Nations with the creation of a ‘league of democracies’.

The effect would be a more formal continuation of the Bush policy of creating ‘coalitions of the willing’ to bypass the UN Security Council when American policy is frustrated.

There is no great zeal for this idea among America’s democratic allies.

Whether John McCain, through force of will, could forge such an organisation and then make it work must be open to question.

If Iraq were to be considered a test case, given the French and German position at the time, would acting through a ‘league of democracies’ have been any less divisive?

But is this a difference of real substance between the two men?

In Obama’s talk of restoring America’s reputation and renewing American leadership, he rarely mentions the United Nations except to make unspecific pledges of UN reform.

In tone he is clearly more sympathetic to the role of international institutions than his opponent.

But would this translate into a wholly different approach to that of the Bush administration or a McCain administration?

With some of my Lib Dem colleagues I attended the Democrat Convention in Denver this summer. Obama’s Advisers certainly project a candidate who would do things differently, who would engage more with allies, who is a natural multilateralist.

On the other hand John McCain is not cut from the same cloth as George W. Bush when it comes to serious engagement with allies.

He is a frequent visitor to Europe and known to the foreign policy establishment on this side of the Atlantic.

He has been a regular attender of the yearly Munich Conference on security.

But Europeans who hope for an American President, who in the words of the Guardian’s Jonathan Steele, is “less aggressive, less unilateral, less imperial, and more attuned with the complexities of international policy”, pin their hopes on Barack Obama.

Indeed if Europe had to vote there is no doubt who would receive a substantial majority.

A recent poll arranged by leading newspapers across the world such as the Guardian, Le Monde, Canada’s La Presse and Japan’s Yomiru Shimbun, showed that if able to vote Britons would split 64 to 15% in Obama’s favour, the French 70 to 14, the Swiss 83 to 7 and the Poles – arguably one of the most pro-Bush nations in Europe – split 43 to 26 in Obama’s favour.

But what Europeans regularly fail to understand is that whoever they prefer, they will not get a European in the White House, but an American.

With lingering European affection for the Clinton administration, it is rarely remembered that America’s unilateralism, which has found its apogee under George W. Bush, was gathering pace under the Clinton administration.

It was the Clinton Administration that rejected the International Criminal Court, rejected an international ban on landmines, began the process of withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and only signed the Kyoto Treaty in its very last day in office.

The frequently asked question is whether it is strategic interest or national values that drives foreign policy.

In democratic countries the answer is both.

It is the appeal to ‘national values’ that ensures the kind of broad support required to be successfully elected, particularly to the highest office.

Obama’s description of America as the “best, last hope of Earth” is a statement of idealism in the tradition of President Wilson who declared that the United States was created “not to serve ourselves, but to serve mankind.”

It would be easy to dismiss the rhetoric in these elections as mere politicking, carefully judged to appeal to voter groups, but not informative of a President’s actions in power.

But this would be to misjudge the American political character.

Politics loves a definitive soundbite….no more munichs, axis of evil, mission accomplished……and in American politics in particular moral certainty and a sense of destiny are central to the debate about America’s place in the world.

What many Europeans fail to understand, and where to a certain extent their hope in Obama may be misplaced, is that since the end of the Cold War ‘unilateral if we can, multilateral if we must’ has been the spectrum of U.S. foreign policy.

I imagine that Bush defenders would argue vehemently that they had pursued the reverse, namely multilateral if we can, unilateral if we must.

But in reality the distinction may be more verbal than substantial.

The spectrum remains the same and at any one time it will be a matter of choice for an incumbent President where he positions himself.

Is it too cynical to guess that that position will almost always be determined by national interest?

Despite John McCain talking of “good international citizenship” and Barak Obama of “renewing American leadership” it remains open to question whether the new circumstances will result in a wholehearted US commitment to multilateralism.

Nowhere in the foreign policy agenda facing the new President is there greater need for fresh thinking than the Middle East.

U.S. national political culture means that no contender for the presidency can get elected who differs from the current bipartisan approach of the United States towards the Middle East peace process – and to Israel in particular.

The lobbying groups interested in Middle East issues in the United States rarely let candidates talk in generalities and are quick to respond to statements that they consider to be a departure from conventional thinking.

When Barak Obama was reported to have told a group of 40 or so Iowan Democrats during the primaries that “nobody has suffered more than the Palestinians” he was swiftly forced to clarify his remarks saying that it was the failure of Palestinian leadership to recognise Israel that has caused this suffering.

Neither candidate in the campaign seems able or willing to bring new thinking to the table on this issue.

Both agree that the security of Israel should be the starting point.

Both agree that the US should ensure that Israel maintain its military superiority in the region.

Both agree that Hamas must be isolated to achieve an enduring peace.

None of this marks any departure from current US policy.

Under pressure, Obama has appeared to go further than his rival in talking of ‘Jerusalem undivided’ as the capital of Israel.

In Europe too, there is considerable solidarity of view but with quite different emphasis.

All European governments are committed to Israel’s right to exist within secure borders.

All have misgivings about continuing occupation, the Israeli settlement programme, the wall and road blocks which pepper occupied territory.

Most regard these as contrary to International law.

All understand that the pragmatic solution to the issue of Jerusalem will be some form of shared status.

Most accept that no solution is practicable that does not accommodate Hamas.

All previous initiatives, from Oslo, through the Sharm el-Sheikh Road Map, from the Mecca Agreement to Annapolis have foundered on the suspension of the peace process when new crises appear – such as the invasion of Lebanon, or the blockade of Gaza – which then add another list of pre-conditions relating to the changed circumstances before final status solutions can even be raised.

Each side blames the other for the reciprocal non-implementation of commitments.

For instance, the Palestinian authorities have been unable or unwilling to bring a permanent halt to attacks on Israel.

Similarly, the Israeli Government has been unable or unwilling to bring a halt to the expansion of settlements in the West Bank.

But the current paralysis goes beyond reciprocal obstructionism.

The goal of Annapolis to have reached solutions by the end of 2008 is unlikely to be achieved for three main reasons.

First, paralysis in Israel.

The collapse of the Olmert government and the slow process of the formation of its successor under Tzipi Livni, has meant that there is no mandate to take the Annapolis strategy forward.

Current analysis suggests that if Livni is unsuccessful in bringing smaller parties into the draft deal between Kadima and Labour, the consequent election would see Netanyahu’s Likud emerge as the largest party with a mandate to form a coalition of its own.

Although both Livni and Barak are committed to continuing talks with the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, any requirement to include in a coalition deal parties such as the ultra-orthodox Shas, who demand that no negotiations over Jerusalem take place with the Palestinians, means that in the short-term, little meaningful is likely to happen.

Israel’s vibrant democracy is a source of paralysis in itself.

Volatility in the Knesset inevitably means the peace process is stalled.

Without a stable coalition independent of minority parties, a mandate to take the peace process forward and the political will to take on internal barriers to success, such as the radicals in the settler movements, it is difficult to see how progress can be made.

Second, paralysis among the Palestinians.

The split between Fatah and Hamas gives support to the Israeli claim that there is no-one on the Palestinian side to whom they can talk.

Does Abbas have the popular support and political power to implement any agreement he reaches with the Israeli government?

Unwillingness to bring a permanent halt to the strategy of violent Intafada provides those in Israel who have no wish to find an accommodation every excuse not to engage.

The Israeli tactic in seeking to weaken Hamas in favour of Fatah simply strengthens Hamas’ grip on Gaza.

Who believes that in present circumstances a functioning National Unity Government remains achievable?

And without this can the Palestinians credibly deliver on Annapolis?

If the two state solution is to be re energised the Palestinians need to resolve their internal differences and approach the negotiations with a common purpose.

Influence is best underpinned by unity.

Hamas, unpalatable as they might be, are democratically elected representatives.

To preach democracy and to ignore its results is a difficult contradiction to explain.

Third, paralysis in America due to the presidential election.

It is inevitable that in an election year, thoughts turn inward.

The economic crisis has reinforced this tendency.

The Bush administration was optimistic in thinking it would retain the ability to force negotiations at a time when the personnel undertaking the task were soon to be out of office.

In foreign affairs power is ephemeral.

It is not based on title, but on influence, and the ability to bring your party, your government and your country with you and the belief that you can deliver on the promises or pledges made.

Regardless of the continuing focus of figures such as Condoleezza Rice, real power is slipping from the Bush administration and its ability to deliver on promises or bring people to the table is waning.

The American system of government, ensures that the political appointments of any new administration penetrate deep into the State Department.

A change of administration brings a significant change in personnel.

Others are likely to hold off making commitments on the peace process until they see the character of the new administration.

It is easy to be critical, let me try, like so many others to point the road ahead.

Here is a Liberal Six Point Plan for the President’s in-box

With a new President there is the possibility for new impetus.

I suggest a six point plan for the new President, to overhaul thinking, to challenge assumptions and to drive the peace process forward in a new way.

Priority 1 – Do everything you can to create a united front among the Palestinians and give Hamas a stake in the peace process.

This is not to legitimise violence, the use of suicide bombers or the targeting of civilians.

Use back channels or intermediaries if necessary.

Be creative.

The experience of the peace process in Northern Ireland suggests that a cessation of violence can be brought about without insisting that protagonists need to repudiate the beliefs that define them.

The Middle East is not Ulster and the lessons learned cannot always be directly applied but they do provide a point of reference.

Hamas for the foreseeable future, is likely to command significant support within the Palestinian people.

Who believes that anything permanent can be achieved without them?

If the peace process does not accommodate Hamas, how can it succeed?

The second priority for the new American President should be to challenge Israel to refresh its approach.

This is not to undermine or prejudice Israel’s right to exist in peace with recognised borders.

We know that Israeli dependence on the United States, diplomatically and militarily, does not mean that it cedes its destiny to the White House.

For example, despite statements from the United States urging compliance, the United States has been unable to affect the Israeli settlement expansion policy in the West Bank.

The removal of settlements in Gaza was a strategic move rather than an acceptance of the principle of a halt to settlement expansion.

But Olmert’s recent acceptance that territorial gains would have to be traded in a peace settlement is welcome realism.

Build on it.

Hold his successor to it.

Third priority – Bring Syria in from the cold and give it a stake in the peace process.

Syria’s geo-political position in the region will not change.
Geography matters in foreign affairs.

Syria shares borders (and resources such as water) with Turkey, Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and Israel.

It has national and strategic interests in the peace process.

Of course, this means a careful and measured approach. President Assad’s sincerity and the seriousness of his wish to engage with Israel needs to be tested.

It is a question of strategy whether the inclusion of Syria in the peace process means including the Golan in final status agreements or whether this issue is best dealt with separately.

But the recent indirect talks over the Golan with Israel have intrinsic merit of themselves.

They also reflect a non-US inspired initiative that provides some hope that strategic interests in the region are aligning in a way that is productive for peace and an example of the region doing more itself.

Syria’s strong influence on Hezbollah, should be seen as a reason to engage not isolate.

Without Syria, Hezbollah is beholden to Iran.

Syria’s role in Lebanon remains a serious cause for concern.

Some of the provisions of the Security Council resolution 1559 adopted in September 2004 after the withdrawal of Syria’s occupying force have still not been fulfilled, such as the disbanding and disarming of militias.

Impress upon Syria that it has both might and responsibilities.

The fourth priority should be to engage the Arab League more fully in the peace process.

The 2002 peace initiative re-endorsed by the Arab League at Riyadh in 2007 was a serious attempt to normalise Arab-Israeli relations.

I am attracted to the idea of a standing peace conference including the quartet nations and the UN, Israel, the Palestinians, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab nations.

The Arab League should play a much bigger role.

It could facilitate and provide impetus for … standing conference.

I would not rule out, in future, the inclusion of Iran in such a system.

But a standing peace conference would only work if it had agreed objectives.

As President, spell them out.

The fifth priority is therefore to confirm the territorial price for a deal which includes the future of Jerusalem.

Force the parties to be specific – no grandstanding but what will it take?

The sixth priority should be to bring Israel into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation framework and prepare the ground at the 2010 NPT conference for a nuclear free zone in the Middle East.

No matter how many convoluted legal or moral arguments are made for the still unconfirmed possession of nuclear weapons by Israel, it remains the case that a nuclear Israel encourages proliferation in the Middle East.

Peroration

None of these priorities will be easily implemented.

But If they are not the state of paralysis I have described will continue.

Their implementation cannot be achieved by the United States alone but will not be achieved without the United States.

Unilateralism will not do, but multilateralism might.

On the spectrum which I previously described the national interest of the U.S.A. on this issue would dictate a multilateral approach.

There is a lesson here for both Presidential candidates only time will tell if they (or the victor) are willing to learn it.