My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Radice, whose commitment to the European cause is long-standing and equivalent to that of any other. The temptation simply to say that I adopt the speeches of my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace and that of the most reverend Primate is almost overwhelming.

I am deeply disappointed by the outcome of the referendum and I wish to draw some conclusions from that. I hope that the noble Baroness the Leader of the House, will not feel it too presumptuous of me if I say that, from time to time in her speech introducing the debate, I felt more than an echo of Candide: “Everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds”. Unhappily, it is not.

My disappointment, like that of others, has only been exacerbated by the rise in racial incidents which make me reluctant to believe that this is still my country. Those who have led us out of Europe bear a heavy responsibility which I have yet to see them accept or embrace. Mr Johnson, whose fondness for cricket is well established, has retired to the pavilion, having been run out by his partner. Mr Farage has resigned—not for the first, but for the third time—and I think we can believe, with some confidence, that this may not be the end of the chapter.

The truth is that never in peacetime has the United Kingdom faced such uncertainty with such little prospect of early resolution. We are divided socially, politically and economically, and—this is a matter close to the heart of all of us from Scotland—the very future of the United Kingdom is now at stake. Issues of this kind are often explained by the theory of unintended consequences. I have a different theory—the theory of inevitable consequences. It is a theory that we may have cause to revisit tomorrow after the publication of the Chilcot report. We have alienated a generation of young people. If noble Lords doubt that, they should look at the demonstrations and see the average age of those demonstrating with such commitment and enthusiasm.

We have embarked upon a period of economic uncertainty which is gradually, although not necessarily perceptibly, beginning to affect decision-making. This is not about the stock market or even about the pound. It is about the decisions being made in boardrooms about not to invest, not to expand and to consider whether the best interests of their businesses would be served if they were located in the European Union.

There is a paradox. The regions which have had most economic assistance from the European Development Fund have rejected the European Union. How shall we provide the substitute finance in order to compensate them for that unwise decision? The regions most likely to be adversely affected are among those who decided to vote to leave. Again, how shall we deal with the issues of housing, education and transport which may have prompted these individuals to leave the European Union? What about talented individuals and professionals with portable employment skills, such as surgeons and those in information technology, who are increasingly being said to be ready to leave the United Kingdom.

We have just had from the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, assurances that we entering a new golden age of economic success. Sunlit uplands was the only expression he did not use. We are going to have increased influence in the world but my question is when? No one has yet been able to give an assessment, or indeed made an effort, to lay down a date by which we will enter this combination of Arcadia and Utopia. Any party which went to the country in a general election, effecting to offer promising economic progress, but which could not state the date of it, would be laughed out of court—and rightly. Yet, this is the proposition which the people of the United Kingdom are being invited to accept.

There are two inevitable consequences and it is worth looking outside the United Kingdom. First, the efforts of the European Union to deal with Mr Putin will inevitably be diminished by the departure of the United Kingdom from the Union. Mr Putin has two objectives; they are there for all to see—the destabilising of the European Union and the undermining of NATO. We have helped to destabilise the European Union by the decision we now propose to take. Also the relationship which we enjoy with our closest ally, the United States, will inevitably be different, not least because, of course, President Obama went out of his way to say how important it was for the United States that Great Britain was an active member of the European Union, echoing the policy followed by the White House since the days of President Kennedy. Inevitably, the United States will look for a closer relationship with another country in Europe. That is an inevitable consequence of what we are about to do. I think it is equally inevitable that that relationship will be with Germany, echoing the relationship between George Bush senior and Chancellor Schmidt, albeit that that was some years ago. None the less, it was a productive one.

It is said that we are all Brexiters now. Well, I am not a Brexiter and I hold fast to my belief in the European Union for all its faults. I draw attention to this fact: those of us who argued to stay in were willing to acknowledge the faults in the European Union. However, I never heard those who argued to leave acknowledge any of the merits or advantages of doing so. How long will these negotiations that we are talking about take and how easy will they be? The 27 members with whom we shall negotiate will inevitably be bound to follow their own national interests—how could they do otherwise?—particularly Angela Merkel and Mr Hollande, both of whom have general elections next year which already promise to be fraught with difficulty for them. What will be the role of the legislators? Have we to accept anything and everything which is put before us? An unelected House is in a different position from the other place. What is my responsibility, and that of all other noble Lords, if legislation is put before us which we regard as defective or not part of a sufficiently generous settlement between ourselves and the rest of the European Union? Are we simply to accept these things without quibble? Are we simply to say, “Yes, the people have spoken, therefore we must follow that, even if it is our considered and conscientious judgment that to do so in a particular area of legislation is not the correct thing to do”.?

I discount the possibility of a second referendum. I also discount the possibility of a successful challenge in the courts. However, I say this: those who have brought us out dream of an England that never was and a United Kingdom that never can be. We have set ourselves on that path. It is inevitable that I should follow it, but I tell the House this: I do so with a heavy heart.

My Lords, one of the most well-worm clichés in politics is that the devil is in the detail. On this occasion, I venture to suggest that it is more than apposite, because I cannot remember legislation in my time either in the other place or here which contained so many detailed provisions. I have the misfortune to disagree with several of my noble friends on these details, but I happen to believe that the fundamental principles which underlie the Bill—of necessity, proportionality and legality—are ones that the whole House would readily accept.

I was struck by a statement made by the Home Secretary at Third Reading in the other place. She said—and I paraphrase slightly—that the duty of government is to protect its citizens and the duty of Parliament is to hold the Government to account for the way in which they exercise that protection. These cannot be absolute values; they are essentially relative. The extent to which one or other may be emphasised at the expense of the other will always be a decision of fine judgment. It will always be a decision which has to be taken in prevailing circumstances. The kind of legislation introduced in the United Kingdom Parliament in either the First or the Second World War reflected what was thought to be of particular urgency, but we must be clear that what may be proportionate or necessary at one time may not be proportionate or necessary at another.

It is well accepted that the Bill must provide a proper framework with which the judgments to which I have referred can be made, but I thought that the noble Lord, Lord King, who is no longer in his place, made a very sound point about the pace of change. One difficulty about the pace of change is that it is not constant but is always accelerating. When we consider that the iPhone, or rather—I had better be careful that I do not advertise—the mobile phone that we all carry in our pockets now contains a capacity far beyond that of the computers that used to occupy a whole room in the 1960s, it illustrates just how much capability has improved and been changed, and the extent therefore to which legislation has, so far as possible, to keep pace with it.

I am persuaded that this Bill generally provides a proper framework—but, as we have already heard, more amendments have to be made. In the other place, the willingness of both sides of the House to enter into dialogue and discussion helped to produce a Bill which is perhaps not as divisive as it might have been, but has none the less left for your Lordships a variety of issues of importance which will be aired for the first time only during consideration in Committee.

On the double lock, it is still argued by some that approval should be by judge alone. With that conclusion, I respectfully disagree. Parallels with other jurisdictions are dangerous. Sometimes reference is made to what happens in the United States, but it is important to remember that judges in the United States are elected or appointed not just because of their legal ability but because of their political affiliation. That is true in the Supreme Court—hence the controversy which surrounds the choice that Barack Obama may have about the appointment to a vacancy on the Supreme Court Bench.

I am thoroughly convinced that judicial review, or the application of its principles, is more than appropriate. Judicial review is a well-established process both in the common law and in the law of Scotland. Judges are well used to applying its principles and the law, as the Advocate General will certainly be aware, has developed considerably since the case which gave rise to the Wednesbury principle was decided many generations ago.

My belief that the initiation of approval should rest with the Home Secretary seems entirely justified because there will be occasions when the mere granting of a warrant will have political implications. That may be so particularly if there is any question of activity authorised by a warrant taking place abroad. In those situations, the decision being of a political nature, I feel that no judge would be enthusiastic about the proposition that they and they alone should have responsibility for these matters—it would be entirely inimical to the approach that judges take in our system.

I understand the motive behind the amendment made in the other place which provides that the judicial commissioner has to take particular care to apply the general provisions on privacy which are now a centrepiece of the Bill. I suspect that that is an unnecessary belt when there were already adequate braces, because I cannot imagine any judicial commissioner worth his or her salt who would not, in interpreting a particular section of the Act, take account of all the rest of the terms of the Act—indeed, it is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation.

As I have said already, the Government have shown remarkable willingness to accept and adopt proposals for amendments, particularly in relation to the activities of journalists and the relationship between lawyers and their clients.

I will finish by saying a word about bulk powers, which have been and remain controversial. I began by thinking that the jury was out, but it would be more correct to say that the independent reviewer, David Anderson, is out and we will have to wait for his report—but I think that there is confidence on all sides of the House in his ability to bring proper forensic application to these issues and to provide a report which will be of great assistance.

The powers that we are talking about already exist; they are not new powers. David Anderson’s review will provide a safeguard as to whether it is appropriate to continue with them, but, rather as the chairman of the ISC, Dominic Grieve, said in the other place, there is strong and general acceptance that the powers are necessary and proportionate. Without straining the metaphor too much, people say that it is like looking for a needle in a haystack, but you must first have access to the haystack before you have any opportunity of looking for the needle. I commend the Bill.

My Lords, one of the most well-worm clichés in politics is that the devil is in the detail. On this occasion, I venture to suggest that it is more than apposite, because I cannot remember legislation in my time either in the other place or here which contained so many detailed provisions. I have the misfortune to disagree with several of my noble friends on these details, but I happen to believe that the fundamental principles which underlie the Bill—of necessity, proportionality and legality—are ones that the whole House would readily accept.

I was struck by a statement made by the Home Secretary at Third Reading in the other place. She said—and I paraphrase slightly—that the duty of government is to protect its citizens and the duty of Parliament is to hold the Government to account for the way in which they exercise that protection. These cannot be absolute values; they are essentially relative. The extent to which one or other may be emphasised at the expense of the other will always be a decision of fine judgment. It will always be a decision which has to be taken in prevailing circumstances. The kind of legislation introduced in the United Kingdom Parliament in either the First or the Second World War reflected what was thought to be of particular urgency, but we must be clear that what may be proportionate or necessary at one time may not be proportionate or necessary at another.

It is well accepted that the Bill must provide a proper framework with which the judgments to which I have referred can be made, but I thought that the noble Lord, Lord King, who is no longer in his place, made a very sound point about the pace of change. One difficulty about the pace of change is that it is not constant but is always accelerating. When we consider that the iPhone, or rather—I had better be careful that I do not advertise—the mobile phone that we all carry in our pockets now contains a capacity far beyond that of the computers that used to occupy a whole room in the 1960s, it illustrates just how much capability has improved and been changed, and the extent therefore to which legislation has, so far as possible, to keep pace with it.

I am persuaded that this Bill generally provides a proper framework—but, as we have already heard, more amendments have to be made. In the other place, the willingness of both sides of the House to enter into dialogue and discussion helped to produce a Bill which is perhaps not as divisive as it might have been, but has none the less left for your Lordships a variety of issues of importance which will be aired for the first time only during consideration in Committee.

On the double lock, it is still argued by some that approval should be by judge alone. With that conclusion, I respectfully disagree. Parallels with other jurisdictions are dangerous. Sometimes reference is made to what happens in the United States, but it is important to remember that judges in the United States are elected or appointed not just because of their legal ability but because of their political affiliation. That is true in the Supreme Court—hence the controversy which surrounds the choice that Barack Obama may have about the appointment to a vacancy on the Supreme Court Bench.

I am thoroughly convinced that judicial review, or the application of its principles, is more than appropriate. Judicial review is a well-established process both in the common law and in the law of Scotland. Judges are well used to applying its principles and the law, as the Advocate General will certainly be aware, has developed considerably since the case which gave rise to the Wednesbury principle was decided many generations ago.

My belief that the initiation of approval should rest with the Home Secretary seems entirely justified because there will be occasions when the mere granting of a warrant will have political implications. That may be so particularly if there is any question of activity authorised by a warrant taking place abroad. In those situations, the decision being of a political nature, I feel that no judge would be enthusiastic about the proposition that they and they alone should have responsibility for these matters—it would be entirely inimical to the approach that judges take in our system.

I understand the motive behind the amendment made in the other place which provides that the judicial commissioner has to take particular care to apply the general provisions on privacy which are now a centrepiece of the Bill. I suspect that that is an unnecessary belt when there were already adequate braces, because I cannot imagine any judicial commissioner worth his or her salt who would not, in interpreting a particular section of the Act, take account of all the rest of the terms of the Act—indeed, it is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation.

As I have said already, the Government have shown remarkable willingness to accept and adopt proposals for amendments, particularly in relation to the activities of journalists and the relationship between lawyers and their clients.

I will finish by saying a word about bulk powers, which have been and remain controversial. I began by thinking that the jury was out, but it would be more correct to say that the independent reviewer, David Anderson, is out and we will have to wait for his report—but I think that there is confidence on all sides of the House in his ability to bring proper forensic application to these issues and to provide a report which will be of great assistance.

The powers that we are talking about already exist; they are not new powers. David Anderson’s review will provide a safeguard as to whether it is appropriate to continue with them, but, rather as the chairman of the ISC, Dominic Grieve, said in the other place, there is strong and general acceptance that the powers are necessary and proportionate. Without straining the metaphor too much, people say that it is like looking for a needle in a haystack, but you must first have access to the haystack before you have any opportunity of looking for the needle. I commend the Bill.

My Lords, one of the most well-worm clichés in politics is that the devil is in the detail. On this occasion, I venture to suggest that it is more than apposite, because I cannot remember legislation in my time either in the other place or here which contained so many detailed provisions. I have the misfortune to disagree with several of my noble friends on these details, but I happen to believe that the fundamental principles which underlie the Bill—of necessity, proportionality and legality—are ones that the whole House would readily accept.

I was struck by a statement made by the Home Secretary at Third Reading in the other place. She said—and I paraphrase slightly—that the duty of government is to protect its citizens and the duty of Parliament is to hold the Government to account for the way in which they exercise that protection. These cannot be absolute values; they are essentially relative. The extent to which one or other may be emphasised at the expense of the other will always be a decision of fine judgment. It will always be a decision which has to be taken in prevailing circumstances. The kind of legislation introduced in the United Kingdom Parliament in either the First or the Second World War reflected what was thought to be of particular urgency, but we must be clear that what may be proportionate or necessary at one time may not be proportionate or necessary at another.

It is well accepted that the Bill must provide a proper framework with which the judgments to which I have referred can be made, but I thought that the noble Lord, Lord King, who is no longer in his place, made a very sound point about the pace of change. One difficulty about the pace of change is that it is not constant but is always accelerating. When we consider that the iPhone, or rather—I had better be careful that I do not advertise—the mobile phone that we all carry in our pockets now contains a capacity far beyond that of the computers that used to occupy a whole room in the 1960s, it illustrates just how much capability has improved and been changed, and the extent therefore to which legislation has, so far as possible, to keep pace with it.

I am persuaded that this Bill generally provides a proper framework—but, as we have already heard, more amendments have to be made. In the other place, the willingness of both sides of the House to enter into dialogue and discussion helped to produce a Bill which is perhaps not as divisive as it might have been, but has none the less left for your Lordships a variety of issues of importance which will be aired for the first time only during consideration in Committee.

On the double lock, it is still argued by some that approval should be by judge alone. With that conclusion, I respectfully disagree. Parallels with other jurisdictions are dangerous. Sometimes reference is made to what happens in the United States, but it is important to remember that judges in the United States are elected or appointed not just because of their legal ability but because of their political affiliation. That is true in the Supreme Court—hence the controversy which surrounds the choice that Barack Obama may have about the appointment to a vacancy on the Supreme Court Bench.

I am thoroughly convinced that judicial review, or the application of its principles, is more than appropriate. Judicial review is a well-established process both in the common law and in the law of Scotland. Judges are well used to applying its principles and the law, as the Advocate General will certainly be aware, has developed considerably since the case which gave rise to the Wednesbury principle was decided many generations ago.

My belief that the initiation of approval should rest with the Home Secretary seems entirely justified because there will be occasions when the mere granting of a warrant will have political implications. That may be so particularly if there is any question of activity authorised by a warrant taking place abroad. In those situations, the decision being of a political nature, I feel that no judge would be enthusiastic about the proposition that they and they alone should have responsibility for these matters—it would be entirely inimical to the approach that judges take in our system.

I understand the motive behind the amendment made in the other place which provides that the judicial commissioner has to take particular care to apply the general provisions on privacy which are now a centrepiece of the Bill. I suspect that that is an unnecessary belt when there were already adequate braces, because I cannot imagine any judicial commissioner worth his or her salt who would not, in interpreting a particular section of the Act, take account of all the rest of the terms of the Act—indeed, it is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation.

As I have said already, the Government have shown remarkable willingness to accept and adopt proposals for amendments, particularly in relation to the activities of journalists and the relationship between lawyers and their clients.

I will finish by saying a word about bulk powers, which have been and remain controversial. I began by thinking that the jury was out, but it would be more correct to say that the independent reviewer, David Anderson, is out and we will have to wait for his report—but I think that there is confidence on all sides of the House in his ability to bring proper forensic application to these issues and to provide a report which will be of great assistance.

The powers that we are talking about already exist; they are not new powers. David Anderson’s review will provide a safeguard as to whether it is appropriate to continue with them, but, rather as the chairman of the ISC, Dominic Grieve, said in the other place, there is strong and general acceptance that the powers are necessary and proportionate. Without straining the metaphor too much, people say that it is like looking for a needle in a haystack, but you must first have access to the haystack before you have any opportunity of looking for the needle. I commend the Bill.

My Lords, one of the most well-worm clichés in politics is that the devil is in the detail. On this occasion, I venture to suggest that it is more than apposite, because I cannot remember legislation in my time either in the other place or here which contained so many detailed provisions. I have the misfortune to disagree with several of my noble friends on these details, but I happen to believe that the fundamental principles which underlie the Bill—of necessity, proportionality and legality—are ones that the whole House would readily accept.

I was struck by a statement made by the Home Secretary at Third Reading in the other place. She said—and I paraphrase slightly—that the duty of government is to protect its citizens and the duty of Parliament is to hold the Government to account for the way in which they exercise that protection. These cannot be absolute values; they are essentially relative. The extent to which one or other may be emphasised at the expense of the other will always be a decision of fine judgment. It will always be a decision which has to be taken in prevailing circumstances. The kind of legislation introduced in the United Kingdom Parliament in either the First or the Second World War reflected what was thought to be of particular urgency, but we must be clear that what may be proportionate or necessary at one time may not be proportionate or necessary at another.

It is well accepted that the Bill must provide a proper framework with which the judgments to which I have referred can be made, but I thought that the noble Lord, Lord King, who is no longer in his place, made a very sound point about the pace of change. One difficulty about the pace of change is that it is not constant but is always accelerating. When we consider that the iPhone, or rather—I had better be careful that I do not advertise—the mobile phone that we all carry in our pockets now contains a capacity far beyond that of the computers that used to occupy a whole room in the 1960s, it illustrates just how much capability has improved and been changed, and the extent therefore to which legislation has, so far as possible, to keep pace with it.

I am persuaded that this Bill generally provides a proper framework—but, as we have already heard, more amendments have to be made. In the other place, the willingness of both sides of the House to enter into dialogue and discussion helped to produce a Bill which is perhaps not as divisive as it might have been, but has none the less left for your Lordships a variety of issues of importance which will be aired for the first time only during consideration in Committee.

On the double lock, it is still argued by some that approval should be by judge alone. With that conclusion, I respectfully disagree. Parallels with other jurisdictions are dangerous. Sometimes reference is made to what happens in the United States, but it is important to remember that judges in the United States are elected or appointed not just because of their legal ability but because of their political affiliation. That is true in the Supreme Court—hence the controversy which surrounds the choice that Barack Obama may have about the appointment to a vacancy on the Supreme Court Bench.

I am thoroughly convinced that judicial review, or the application of its principles, is more than appropriate. Judicial review is a well-established process both in the common law and in the law of Scotland. Judges are well used to applying its principles and the law, as the Advocate General will certainly be aware, has developed considerably since the case which gave rise to the Wednesbury principle was decided many generations ago.

My belief that the initiation of approval should rest with the Home Secretary seems entirely justified because there will be occasions when the mere granting of a warrant will have political implications. That may be so particularly if there is any question of activity authorised by a warrant taking place abroad. In those situations, the decision being of a political nature, I feel that no judge would be enthusiastic about the proposition that they and they alone should have responsibility for these matters—it would be entirely inimical to the approach that judges take in our system.

I understand the motive behind the amendment made in the other place which provides that the judicial commissioner has to take particular care to apply the general provisions on privacy which are now a centrepiece of the Bill. I suspect that that is an unnecessary belt when there were already adequate braces, because I cannot imagine any judicial commissioner worth his or her salt who would not, in interpreting a particular section of the Act, take account of all the rest of the terms of the Act—indeed, it is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation.

As I have said already, the Government have shown remarkable willingness to accept and adopt proposals for amendments, particularly in relation to the activities of journalists and the relationship between lawyers and their clients.

I will finish by saying a word about bulk powers, which have been and remain controversial. I began by thinking that the jury was out, but it would be more correct to say that the independent reviewer, David Anderson, is out and we will have to wait for his report—but I think that there is confidence on all sides of the House in his ability to bring proper forensic application to these issues and to provide a report which will be of great assistance.

The powers that we are talking about already exist; they are not new powers. David Anderson’s review will provide a safeguard as to whether it is appropriate to continue with them, but, rather as the chairman of the ISC, Dominic Grieve, said in the other place, there is strong and general acceptance that the powers are necessary and proportionate. Without straining the metaphor too much, people say that it is like looking for a needle in a haystack, but you must first have access to the haystack before you have any opportunity of looking for the needle. I commend the Bill.