Ming Campbell gave this speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy. You can listen to the speech here.
It is a great pleasure and privilege to follow the Secretary General and High Representative.
It has always been my belief that peace in the Middle East cannot be fully realised unless there is agreement, not only between the principal actors in the Middle East, but in a global approach to the Middle East.
The challenge for Europeans has always been to find ways of working together, rather than competing with each other, and so to promote a common agenda for the region.
With a common agenda, Europe can be a more active and productive partner in the peace process, with the countries of the Middle East, and with the other members of the Quartet.
I observe also that the situation in the Middle East provides yet another compelling reason for the continuance of a strong transatlantic partnership fit for the 21st century (as we shall discuss tomorrow).
Chancellor Merkel has spoken about the need for “a broader division of labour within the international community“.
Europe must shoulder a greater share of the diplomatic and military burden.
But a division of labour is only successful if each partner is agreed on the strategic goals and aims.
If division of labour results in division of strategy, common objectives are impossible to achieve.
So our first challenge is ensure we are agreed on a common strategy.
Let me sketch out in the time available two of the priorities I see facing us.
These are first; doing all we can to forestall civil wars in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, and second; to seek to bring Iran within international influence.
Without tackling these priorities, efforts to forge a common strategy for the revival and implementation of the roadmap will not succeed.
The first priority is to act in concert to avert the possibility of three separate but linked civil wars: in Iraq, in Lebanon, and in the Palestinian Territories.
These are powder kegs upon which the stalled Middle East peace process currently rests. Every one of these requires concerted international action.
I would like to concentrate my remarks here on Iraq which I believe to be the most pressing of these three.
Lebanon remains fragile, while the Palestinians have offered some small signs of encouragement.
But in Iraq, whether you choose to define the current situation as civil war or not, the facts on the ground speak for themselves.
It is not only the killings, bombings and kidnappings that have gathered pace – at the same time we see the slide towards the segregation of communities which provides a natural geography and battleground for civil and sectarian conflict.
The new Iraq show all the signs of a failed state. Iraq’s new institutions lack coherence and common purpose. Its political infrastructure is inadequate to meet the challenge of bringing its communities together with the promise of a prosperous future. And its security services have become embroiled in internecine violence.
After four years of occupation, coalition forces have become a focus for resentment rather than a force for containing internal conflict.
I regret that the core of the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group has been unacceptable to the current American administration.
Nor is there unanimity in Congress about the way forward.
I fear that the President’s new strategy is likely to inflame resentment, not to bring stability.
It is my conclusion that it is now no longer in the UK national interest to maintain a British military presence in Iraq.
This, it should be said, is a minority view in the British Parliament, though not among the British people.
If we had a United Nations led and internationally endorsed peace process for Iraq, the withdrawal of British, and eventually all coalition troops, would be manageable within a framework that provided for continuing obligations to Iraq to be met.
Such a process should include:
- A regional contact group, to strengthen and promote the engagement of Iraq’s neighbours;
- A comprehensive, national disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration strategy for the militias;
- Enhanced measures to train, equip, professionalise and regularise Iraqi security forces;
- A time-limited programme for phased security transfer and withdrawal of coalition troops.
Effective? More likely to be effective than the strategy of remaining as long as the Iraqi Government requests us to do so, or the current surge strategy, less elegantly described by a distinguished commentator as “one more heave“.
Let me turn to Iran, the second priority.
Regional stability is dependent upon the engagement of Iran.
Continuing isolation of Iran will have significant repercussions.
No comprehensive peace agreement in Iraq will last for long without the willingness of Iran to play a constructive part.
A now isolated Iran seeks to influence events first by enrolling Shia populations in other Arab states, and second by using any means to advance national security.
This has led Iran towards the sponsorship of terrorism and the aspiration for a military nuclear capability.
Seen from an Iranian perspective, what incentive is there to abandon the enrichment of uranium when it is surrounded by what it sees as aggressive international forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Seen from an Iranian perspective what incentive is there to influence Shias in the region and encourage stability and co-operation, when the language they believe they hear is of confrontation.
I do not believe we can exclude Iran from discussions on Iraq, on Afghanistan, or the wider Middle East peace process.
The regime in Tehran is authoritarian and nationalist.
But in spite of its distasteful characteristics it has interests and influence that cannot be ignored.
It is important to remember that Mr. Ahmadinejad’s party did not do well in recent local elections; that the economy is suffering; and that there are increasing signs from inside Iran of anxiety about the consequences of sanctions.
These provide an opportunity that should not be ignored.
It will not be possible to take advantage of this opportunity if we persist in an overt threat of military action.
